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What is it, who has it, and how is it defined?*
1. Introduction
Commentators on the research into the evolution of language frequently note 
the unprecedented increase in the number of publications on this topic in the 
last decade of the twentieth century (see e.g. Christiansen & Kirby 2003a). 
Many also point out that the change was not only quantitative. The very 
nature of this interest was becoming different from earlier speculations 
about the origins of language, with new computational tools and bodies 
of empirical evidence finally  substantiating  the claims of academic  rigour 
(e.g. Christiansen & Kirby 2003b). But this upsurge also produced some 
degree of conceptual confusion: it became evident that researchers with 
different disciplinary backgrounds understood the evolution of language 
in vastly different ways. What exactly was it that evolution of language 
research should aim to explain? There emerged a need for a more precise self 
determination of this research field and defining its explanatory goals, which 
involved a disambiguation of the very term evolution of language.
The concept of evolution presented itself as relatively unproblematic. 
A very broad, non-technical construal along the lines of “the phylogenetic 
emergence of a biological trait in a species” was sufficiently inclusive and 
innocuous to be implicitly accepted as universal common ground. If real – not 
purely verbal – debates could continue over the particular selection pressures, 
preconditions, developmental trajectories, stages (e.g. Jackendoff 1999), 
modalities (e.g. Corballis 2002), rates of change (e.g. Worden 1995), the 
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relative importance of particular mechanisms such as natural selection (e.g. 
Pinker & Bloom 1990), or even the overall scientific value of explanations 
offered (Lewontin 1998) – it was precisely because the general notion 
of evolution that was present in the background was not problematic.
Language, on the other hand, had always been a refractory notion. Two 
obvious complicating factors were its multilayered ontology, and the plurality 
of historical and contemporary approaches coexisting within linguistics and 
philosophy.  In  the specific context of  the evolution of  language, however, 
the  principal  difficulty  seemed  to  arise  from  the  interdisciplinary  nature 
of  this  research  field.  Not  a  proprietary  notion  of  any  single  discipline, 
“language” had come to be used differently in each of the involved branches 
of knowledge, reflecting their respective theoretical interests and biases, and 
this in turn leading to hidden assumptions. As one example, Rudolph Botha 
(2000) enumerates thirteen different designations of the term “language” 
contained in a single edited volume.
In an attempt to remedy this situation,1  three  influential  scholars 
in disciplines relevant to the evolution of language – the comparative 
psychologist Marc Hauser, the linguist Noam Chomsky and the biologist 
Tecumseh Fitch – wrote a paper designed to lay down a general conceptual 
framework within which a (more) meaningful discussion about the evolution 
of language could take place (Hauser et al. 2002). Specifically, they made 
a consequential terminological/conceptual distinction, dividing the faculty 
of language into FLN (Faculty of language – narrow sense) and FLB (Faculty 
of language – broad sense). Unfortunately, three years later, debating 
Pinker  and  Jackendoff,  the  three  authors  dropped  their  original  definition 
of this distinction and replaced it with another (Fitch et al. 2005). Far from 
achieving their goal “to clarify misunderstandings and aid interdisciplinary 
rapprochement” (Fitch et al.  2005:  179),  establishing  two  conflicting 
definitions of FLN/FLB had the effect of further adding to the confusion.
In the rest of this paper I argue that:
a) t he concept of FLN/FLB has acquired central importance in the 
evolution of language and has also achieved recognisable status 
beyond that field;
b)  the  two  definitions  of  the  FLN/FLB  concept  do  not  just  differ 
insignificantly,  but  rather  they  differ  fundamentally  in  a  way  that 
precludes their reconciliation;
 1 In a later text, Fitch (2010: 22) makes his motivation clear: “We coined this term 
[FLN] simply to clarify discussion and avoid confusion, once we realized that researchers 
(including ourselves) had been using the same word, ‘language,’ to talk about two different 
things (FLB and FLN) for many years, and thus had been talking past each other”.
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c)  because  of  the  centrality  of  the  FLN/FLB  concept,  the  conflict 
between the two definitions is not a trivial terminological matter but 
has  important  consequences  for  the  research  field  of  the  evolution 
of language.
Although thematically related, this text is not intended as an 
investigation of the theoretical position of Hauser, Fitch and Chomsky or 
as a comprehensive summary of their debate with Pinker and Jackendoff. 
These topics have already received very extensive coverage in existing 
analyses from a number of authors including myself (see Wróbel, this issue; 
Barceló-Coblijn, this issue – Wacewicz 2007, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 
2008). Rather, as stated above, it specifically targets an isolated but arguably 
crucial terminological distinction between FLN and FLB.
2. FLN 1: the 2002 definition
In the original 2002 paper by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, the authors put 
forward a number of interesting strong hypotheses that have canalised 
a sizeable proportion of the subsequent research into the evolution 
of language (especially the “recursion only” hypothesis – see e.g. Parker 
2006). Nevertheless, the centrepiece of their paper was none of the empirical 
hypotheses, but rather the terminological distinction into FLN and FLB.
Hauser et al. (2002) unambiguously define FLN as the “computational 
core” of the language faculty: the cognitive subsystem responsible for 
generating the discrete infinity of linguistic expressions. Importantly, FLN 
thus  defined  is  a  term  internal to linguistic theory, as the criteria for its 
delineation are not interdisciplinary, but rather remain entirely within the 
domain of linguistics. In other words, the distinction into FLN and FLB 
is one made by the linguist and based on a particular theoretical account 
of language (and thus of “the language faculty”), without resort to data or 
expertise from other disciplines such as comparative biology or psychology.
As originally  defined,  FLN,  the  core  device  for  abstract  grammatical 
operations, is one part of the more general faculty of language in the broad 
sense (FLB), which also includes at least two other major components: the 
sensorimotor (SM) subsystem and the conceptual-intentional (CI) subsystem. 
SM and CI are not explained in detail. Hauser et al. (2002) illustrate them by 
examples and make it clear that those subsystems do not process “linguistic” 
representations, but rather interface with the FLN via phonology and formal 
semantics, respectively.
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The relation between FLN and FLB, as presented in Hauser et al. 2002, 
is captured in Figure 1 below.
Fig 1. The FLN/FLB distinction in Hauser et al. 2002
In the entire paper, a single passage can be found that does hint – albeit 
unclearly – at the possibility of a construal of the FLN/FLB distinction 
alternative to one just described:
For example, Liberman and his associates... have argued that the 
sensory-motor systems were specifically adapted for language, and 
hence should be considered part of FLN… In this article, we leave 
these questions open,  restricting attention  to FLN as  just defined 
but  leaving  the  possibility  of  a  more  inclusive  definition  open 
to further empirical research. (2002: 1571)
The above fragment could be read as suggesting that distinguishing 
FLN from SM or CI is a matter of hypothesis, not definition. However, this 
interpretation does not find any support elsewhere in the text:
Faculty of language–broad sense (FLB). FLB includes an internal 
computational system (FLN, below) combined with at least two 
other organism-internal systems, which we call <sensory-motor> 
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and <conceptual-intentional.> (2002: 1569–1570) [italics in the 
original]
FLB includes sensory-motor, conceptual-intentional, and other 
possible  systems  (which we  leave  open);  FLN  includes  the  core 
grammatical computations that we suggest are limited to recursion. 
(2002: 1570; caption for Fig. 2 in that paper)
Faculty of language—narrow sense (FLN). FLN is the abstract 
linguistic computational system alone, independent of the other 
systems with which it interacts and interfaces. (2002: 1571) [italics 
in the original]
This research space identifies, as viable, problems concerning the 
evolution of sensory-motor systems, of conceptual-intentional 
systems, and of FLN. (2002: 1571) 
By this hypothesis, FLB contains a wide variety of cognitive and 
perceptual mechanisms shared with other species, but only those 
mechanisms underlying FLN — particularly its capacity for 
discrete infinity — are uniquely human. (2002: 1573) [italics for 
emphasis – SW]
Second, although we have argued that most if not all of FLB is 
shared with other species, whereas FLN may be unique to humans, 
this represents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further 
empirical investigation. (2002: 1576) [italics for emphasis – SW]
Hypothesis 3: Only FLN is uniquely human. (2002: 1573) [italics 
in the original]
The last three quotes are unequivocal and conclusive. Quite obviously, 
a hypothesis regarding the nature of some unobserved, postulated entity is 
something necessarily different from a definition of that entity: the former 
is  a  statement  awaiting  corroboration  or  falsification  by  empirical  data 
not yet present or accessible, whereas the latter is a stipulation indifferent 
to any further empirical findings. The relation between the two is mutually 
exclusive, i.e. one and the same statement cannot simultaneously function 
as  a  definition  of  a  phenomenon  and  an  empirical  hypothesis  about  it.  In 
Hauser et al. (2002), the “uniqueness to humans” feature of FLN is tagged, 
repeatedly and explicitly, as a hypothesis about FLN, which decisively bars 
the possibility of this feature being part of FLN’s definition.
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2.1. Summing up – FLN in Hauser et al. (2002)
Definitions:
FLN  is  the  core  computational  mechanism  of  the  broadly  defined 
language faculty.
Hypotheses:
FLN is the part of FLB that is unique to humans (i.e. FLN is unique 
to humans, and no other part of FLB is).
FLN can be equated with recursion.
3. FLN 2: the 2005 definition
As stated above, the 2005 article by Fitch, Hauser and Chomsky (published 
as a reply to Pinker & Jackendoff 2005) provides a different definition of the 
FLN/FLB distinction. FLN is no longer listed as a specific component of FLB 
alongside SM and CI. Instead, FLB as now described includes SM, CI and 
“the computational components of language that have been the traditional 
focus of study in modern linguistics,” and the whole division is played down 
as only “one potential cut through FLB” (Fitch et al. 2005: 182). Fitch et al. 
(2005) now claim that FLN is defined through being unique to both humans 
and language.
To this end, we denoted “language” in a broad sense, including 
all of the many mechanisms involved in speech and language, 
regardless of their overlap with other cognitive domains or with 
other species, as the “faculty of language in the broad sense” or 
FLB. This term is meant to be inclusive, describing all of the 
capacities that support language independently of whether they 
are specific  to  language and uniquely human. Second, given  that 
language as a whole is unique to our species, it seems likely that 
some subset of the mechanisms of FLB is both unique to humans, 
and to language itself. We dubbed this subset of mechanisms the 
faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN). (Fitch et al. 2005: 
180–181)
We thus made the further, and independent, terminological proposal 
to denote that subset of FLB that is both specific to language and 
to humans as FLN. To repeat a central point in our paper: FLN is 
composed of those components of the overall faculty of language 
(FLB) that are both unique to humans and unique to or clearly 
specialized for language. (Fitch et al. 2005: 182)
223The narrow faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how is it defined?
The relation between FLN and FLB, as redefined in Fitch et al. 2005, is 
captured in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. The FLN/FLB distinction in Hauser et al. 2002
Not surprisingly, the reversal of the content of their terminological 
proposal and empirical hypothesis relative to the 2002 text by those authors 
results in direct contradictions. Compare:
The contents of FLN are to be empirically determined, and could 
possibly be empty, if empirical findings showed that none of the 
mechanisms involved are uniquely human or unique to language, 
and  that  only  the way  they  are  integrated  is  specific  to  human 
language. The distinction itself is intended as a terminological aid 
to interdisciplinary discussion and rapprochement, and obviously 
does not constitute a testable hypothesis. (Fitch et al. 2005: 180–
181)
Second, although we have argued that most if not all of FLB is 
shared with other species, whereas FLN may be unique to humans, 
this represents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further 
empirical investigation. (Hauser et al. 2002: 1576)
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3.1. Summing up – FLN in Fitch et al. (2005)
Definitions:
FLN is the part of FLB that is unique to humans.
Hypotheses:
Only recursion is unique to humans.
4. The possible counterarguments
In what follows, I establish my claims listed in Section 1 by outlining the 
possible counterarguments against them2 and then addressing each of those 
in turn.
4.1. “The FLN/FLB distinction was corrected in the 2005 text”
While in their second text the authors are indeed explicit about the criteria 
of the FLN/FLB distinction, two rather grave problems remain.
Firstly, the discrepancy between the 2002 paper and the 2005 follow-
up has never been acknowledged. In Fitch et al. (2005: 181–183), through 
a series of demonstrably false claims, the authors maintain that the “FLN2” 
definition,  and  hence  the  “uniqueness  to  humans”  criterion, was  in  place 
in the original paper. The authors’ failure to acknowledge the contradiction 
and their misreporting their own text are a source of confusion and reason 
for concern.
The above point might be a trivial one if it was the latter text by the 
three authors that had the status of a classic. However, since the FLN/
FLB distinction was introduced in 2002, it is the original Science paper 
that functions as the classic reference in research and education related 
to language evolution and related disciplines (see 4.2 below). As one 
example, it has repeatedly been claimed that Hauser et al. (2002) define 
FLN as those aspects of the language faculty that are unique both to humans 
and to language (e.g. Samuels 2009: 356) – which, as has been shown here, 
is simply not true. Ascribing to sources content that is not present there is 
hardly conducive to good scholarship.
Secondly, and more importantly, Fitch, Hauser and Chomsky themselves 
continue to use the FLN/FLB terminology in two disparate senses without 
 2 Some of those counterarguments are based on discussions during and after the con-
ferences Evolang 6, Evolang 7 and Protolang 1.
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any acknowledgement of this problem, therefore propagating confusion. 
Fitch (e.g. 2005, 2010) appears to be dedicated to, and consistent in, the later 
interpretation, FLN2, i.e. with the “double uniqueness” criterion. In contrast, 
Chomsky’s (e.g. 2007) main commitment seems to be the delineation of the 
core linguistic component of the faculty of language as distinct from the SM 
and CI systems, which would strongly suggest his embracing FLN1. Hauser, 
however, at different occasions subscribed to both the “computational core” 
(FLN1) and “double uniqueness” (FLN2). Compare: 
FLN – and especially the mechanism of recursion – was defined by 
Hauser et al. (2002) as a computational process that is responsible 
for the generative and hierarchical properties of narrow syntax.” 
(Tincoff & Hauser 2006: 536)
FLB is simply those processes of the mind that are both necessary 
and sufficient to support language. Thus, for example, attention is 
involved in language processing but is neither unique to language 
nor unique to humans. FLN includes those processes that are both 
uniquely human and unique to language. Providing a demonstration 
that a particular process is uniquely human doesn’t clinch its 
place in FLN, as it is possible that this uniquely human process is 
implemented in other domains of human knowledge, and thus, not 
unique to language. (Hauser et al. 2007: 105)
As a result, FLN lives on in the two distinct, discrepant senses both 
of which are widely represented in current literature on the evolution 
of language: see e.g. Armstrong and Wilcox (2007), Johansson (2005), 
Kurcz  (2004),  Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk  (2008)  –  FLN1;  and  Okanoya 
(2007), Parker (2006), Samuels (2009), and Számadó and Szathmáry (2006) 
– FLN2. Occasionally (e.g. Kinsella 2009), authors equivocate between the 
two interpretations, conflate them or use interchangeably without recognizing 
the qualitative difference.
4.2. “The FLN/FLB distinction is not central but only peripheral  
to the evolution of language research”
The FLN/FLB distinction is arguably the single most important concepts 
in language evolution, and the topic of FLN/FLB remains in the centre 
of  conferences  and  edited  volumes  in  this  research  field.  Of  course, 
“importance”  is  difficult  to measure  objectively,  but  several  factors  serve 




distinction in respectable tertiary literature such as The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy or The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics.
Secondly, the text by Hauser et al. (2002), consisting almost exclusively 
in formulating and expounding the FLN/FLB concept, has effectively become 
not  only  one  of  the  most  influential  papers  in  the  evolution  of  language 
research but probably the most  influential one.  In  this case,  importance  is 
measurable more directly by the number of citations; Hauser et al. (2002) 
is reported as cited 608 times by the ISI Web of Knowledge, 1730 times by 
Google Scholar.  In  comparison,  the figures  for Pinker  and Bloom  (1990), 
widely  recognised  as  the  flagship  of  the  field  of  language  evolution  (e.g. 
Christiansen & Kirby 2003a), are 414 citations in the ISI Web of Knowledge 
and 1427 in Google Scholar3 – despite its being published more than a decade 
earlier. For  additional  arguments  regarding  the  significance of  this  former 
text see Wróbel (this issue).
4.3. “The difference between FLN1 and FLN2 is insubstantial and has 
no tangible effect on research into the evolution of language” 
The difference between FLN1 and FLN2 is neither purely verbal nor 
trivial, which is best attested to by the inferences generated by each of those 
interpretations. Two questions can be considered as examples, one of a more 
conceptual nature, and the other with very real consequences in framing 
research priorities.
Question 1: Can FLN be an empty set? 
FLN1 automatically precludes this possibility. On definition 2, however, 
such a possibility exists, and is asserted repeatedly, in Fitch et al. (2005).
Question 2: Could analogous traits be part of FLN?
Definition 1  allows  such  a  possibility,  but  given FLN 2,  this  is  ruled 
out. Assuming that at least one of the original goals behind the FLN/FLB 
distinction was  to avoid  the conflation of all  the  research questions  to  the 
domain of FLB – in other words, to single out FLN as a special, “nobler” 
explanatory target – it is not at all clear what theoretical gains would 
follow from FLN2. One disturbing consequence would be that a trait 
crucial to language use in contemporary humans (e.g. vocal imitation) 
would somehow become “less interesting” once an analogue of it is found 
 3 All searches on 14.02.2011. Parameters for ISI Web of Knowledge: Timespan=All 
Years. Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH.
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in another species. Additional problems arise with deciding about the identity 
of particular traits, i.e. how to judge whether an analogous trait counts as the 
same trait – but such problems have already been covered by previous 
commentators.
Finally, FLN2 is hardly an improvement over FLN1, as it offers no 
definition of  language  that  this field of  research  could use. When dealing 
with the evolution of language, the question of “what counts as language” 
is one that is ultimately impossible to escape. Indeed, providing a workable 
definition of language for language evolution studies seems to have been the 
original motivation of Hauser et al. (2002), and FLN1 gave a coherent and 
acceptable (if controversial) answer. In contrast, FLN2, based on the “double 
uniqueness” criterion, is at a different level and itself presupposes some 
answer to this more fundamental question of how to delineate “language.”
5. Conclusion
The evolution of language, as a research area, is special in many ways. One 
of those ways is its inherently interdisciplinary status with its usual afflictions, 
i.e. the terminological barriers to fruitful communication of researchers 
with different backgrounds. The FLN/FLB concept, created with intent 
to improve this condition, has now become an influential but fundamentally 
confused bit of terminology, complicating rather than clarifying dialogue 
across disciplinary borders.
The suggested overall conclusions are twofold. Firstly, researchers into 
language evolution should not accept the FLN/FLB distinction at face value, 
but rather refer meticulously to primary literature. Ultimately, it is hoped 
that the FLN/FLB distinction will be supplanted by a more compelling one, 
driven by a more coherent research agenda. Until then, FLN1, i.e. FLN 
as defined in Hauser et al. (2002), should probably be used, both for reasons 
of priority and theoretical usefulness.
As a second point, it is astonishing that such a major conceptual 
inconsistency  between  the  two  definitions  of  FLN/FLB  has  remained 
essentially unnoticed or ignored. This may be due to the proclaimed 
“clarification”  of  this  issue  in  Fitch  et al.  (2005);  however,  as  has  been 
demonstrated,  this  “clarification,”  based  on  demonstrably  false  claims, 
only added to the confusion. It may signal a need for a radical top-down 
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